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Naming the Tragedy
Eric T. Freyfogle

*

Since its appearance in 1968, Garret Hardin’s short article in
Science, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” has become an especially
handy source for scholars to cite in support of an array of claims
about nature and why we misuse it. 1 In his article, Hardin drew
attention to the rising human population and offered an explanation
why, absent intervention, it would keep rising, well beyond the
planet’s carrying capacity and even when it brought suffering and
degradation. 2 To illustrate his explanatory theory Hardin included a
tale about a grazing pasture that suffered tragic decline because of
overuse. 3 It was this short, fictional narrative that drew great interest
and turned Hardin’s article into a classic.
In Hardin’s story, individual cattle grazers were free to use the
pasture as they liked. They could add more livestock at any time,
and do so even when the extra animals caused overgrazing and
degradation. An individual grazer had an incentive to act this way,
to add an extra head, because the forage eaten by the animal
benefited the grazer. The additional animal brought net harm due
to the overgrazing, particularly as other grazers followed suit. But
that harm was spread among all grazers while the benefits of the
extra animal went to the owner alone. Each grazer thus had an
incentive to act in ways that brought tragic consequences to the
landscape and its users. For the “rational” grazer, Hardin
contended, adding more animals was “the only sensible course.” 4
And it was individual freedom that made it all possible. As Hardin
famously contended, “[r]uin is the destination toward which all
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that
believes in the freedom of the commons.” 5
* Swanlund Chair and Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This essay is
part of a larger project, tentatively entitled A Good that Transcends: Culture Change and Our
Common Home, forthcoming from the University of Chicago Press.
1 . Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968). A hint of the utility
of the article can be gained by a search for citations to it in the Westlaw database; a search
on December 11, 2014, turned up 1,855 items.
2. Id. at 1243–44, 1246.
3. Id. at 1244.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Hardin described his grazing region as a commons, and it was, in
the sense that many people shared its use. 6 More precisely the region
was an open-access commons in that no norms or rules limited the
ability of any grazer to graze more animals at will. 7 The outcome of
this freedom, Hardin asserted, was tragic in that it led inexorably to
misuse of the pasture and harm to the grazers themselves. Hardin
did not pause to define good pasture use; he did not, that is, explain
how he would distinguish between the legitimate use of a grazing
region and the misuse of it. His was a simple tale, with no need to
get specific. At some point, overgrazing reduced the region’s forage
productivity, an outcome he deemed bad.
Hardin’s conclusion was that this kind of selfish freedom needed
to disappear. In some way lawmakers needed to limit it through
coercive means. As a democrat, Hardin believed that binding limits
should be “mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people
affected,” not imposed by autocrats. 8 He thus phrased his solution as
mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon. Coercion could take the
form of something like governmental regulation. It could also come,
in the case of the grazing tragedy, through the division of the pasture
into privately owned shares. 9 If the latter was done, the ill effects of
overgrazing by any individual grazer would be felt by the grazer
alone, not shared by others, thus aligning the costs and benefits of
overgrazing and leading, presumably, to less or no overuse. Hardin
presented these remedial options as variations on the theme of
mutual coercion, but many readers would treat them as more
distinct—a public ownership-regulatory option and a privateproperty option. 10
Over the years Hardin’s tale has become something of a
Rorschach test, akin to the personality test developed by Swiss
6. Id. (describing his fictional pasture as one “open to all”).
7. A classic discussion is Siegfried V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, “Common
Property” as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975).
8. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247. Hardin emphasized this point to counter any implication
that “coercion implie[d] arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats . . . .” Id.
9. Id. at 1245 (“The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property,
or something formally like it.”).
10. Id. at 1247. Taken as a whole, Hardin’s article treats privatization as a form of mutual
coercion, as it is. But in early parts of his article, before introducing the idea of mutual coercion, he
presents private property as a solution without describing it in those terms, thus facilitating the view
that they are different options. Id. at 1245 (“The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted
by private property, or something formally like it.”); id. (To avert tragedy of commons in National
Parks “[w]e might sell them off as private property”).
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psychologist Hermann Rorschach in which patients are shown
inkblots and asked to describe what they see. In much the same way,
readers of Hardin’s tale can come away with widely varied
interpretations. What seems important in this story? What truths are
displayed? And what omissions or errors might be embedded in it
and in Hardin’s explanation?
The possible answers to these questions are many, and very likely
turn mostly on traits that a reader brings to the narrative. Based on
answers to such questions one might well discern the political
leanings of a reader and probably more: his ecological
understandings, his thoughts about government pro and con, the
value he places in standard neoclassical economics, and his views of
private ownership and its benefits. Indeed, one might guess that
answers from readers could be spread out along a graduated
spectrum. Does the tale sum up our environmental predicament? Is
it proof of the value of private property and support for more of it?
Is it proof of the ill effects of allowing people to act free of control?
And might it contain still other lessons about human nature,
economics, and our planetary plight?
Hardin’s tale is so malleable in part because Hardin presented it
simply and most readers have reacted with equal simplicity. The
story, though, can also be teased apart more carefully, with
particular regard for embedded assumptions and for issues that,
though raised implicitly, were not flagged or probed by Hardin
himself. The story, to be sure, has to do with ecological decline.
But it takes digging to get to the bottom of this story, both to
figure out why the degradation takes place and what steps the
grazers (or others) would need to take to avoid the decline. On
both points—the root causes of degradation and the steps needed
to avert it—Hardin’s story is radically incomplete. To fill it out is to
gain considerable insight both on the causes of today’s
environmental ills and on the reasons why modern society has such
trouble coming to grips with them.
I. THREE BASICS
Readers of Hardin’s tale of all political and cultural stripes ought
to find agreement on three basic claims about the tragedy. It is useful
to begin with them before moving on to points that are less clear.
For starters, the degradation of Hardin’s grazing region was
caused by the grazers themselves. The cattle, to be sure, ate the
1417

06.FREYFOGLE.FIN-FIXED (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/2/2016 7:26 PM

2014

plants and fouled the waterways. But the grazers introduced the
animals and controlled them. People misused the region, not
bovines. It is an essential point and foundational. In this setting
and many others, we gain clarity by pointing the finger at the
people causing the harm, as Hardin did, not at the harm itself.
Second, few readers are likely to think grazing is always
ecologically bad, even if they object to treating cattle this way. That
is, some level of grazing is acceptable in some places. Certain grazing
entails the legitimate use of nature by people, while grazing at a
higher level or in the wrong place crosses the line and becomes
abusive. To figure out whether grazing is excessive thus requires a
line between legitimate use and abuse. All grazing brings changes to
a landscape so this line-drawing in effect distinguishes between
changes made to nature that are acceptable or ameliorative and
changes that instead are unwise, immoral or otherwise misdirected.
This line-drawing is very much a normative task, even as it makes
extensive use of scientific facts. It is up to people to decide, based on
their values and normative preferences, where the line should lie.
Nature does not draw it; it merely (and importantly) reacts to what
humans do. Nor can science alone draw it even as science might tell
us the consequences of alternative grazing options.
The third basic lesson embedded in Hardin’s tale is that the
grazers collectively would be better off if they got together and came
up with coercive rules limiting their individual uses of the commons.
Pretty much all readers can see that the grazers ought to do this, and
that they likely would do it given adequate opportunity. By
(important) implication, the “rational” decision that a grazer might
sensibly make acting as an individual—to add more cattle—would
likely differ from the equally rational decision the same individual
would make when joining with other grazers to set up a governance
regime. Working with others the individual could vote to impose
limits that would keep him from doing exactly what he would
choose to do as an autonomous individual.
We need to put the last point plainly: the decision a grazer makes
as an individual autonomous market actor could differ radically from
the decision he would likely make in his role as citizen-lawmaker.
Both decisions reflect what the grazer wants. Both also make good
sense in simple economic terms; they are, in that regard,
intellectually coherent. In short, the preferences of grazers—the
preferences of people generally—vary based on the role they play.
1418
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This divergence has long been known as the citizen-consumer
dichotomy. 11 It ought to be, but for the most part is not, central to
nearly all talk about our environmental plight. Similarly, Hardin’s
tale ought to stand, though it rarely does, as the poster case refuting
the common claim that people show their true wants when they
spend their own money as individuals, not when they tell pollsters
how they would vote.
II. WHAT IS A COMMONS?
One hornet’s nest that Hardin stirred up arose from his use of
the term commons. In the case of population growth, he meant the
term to refer to the entire planet, which was a commons from the
perspective of people because they all shared it (albeit in highly
unequal ways). 12 That use of the term drew little objection. What
became contentious was his use of the term commons to describe the
grazing region. The pasture was also a commons, but it was one that
scholars would term an open-access commons, one that grazers
could use free of any norms or limits. 13 There are such commons in
the world—the atmosphere for the most part, and many fisheries. 14
But long-time grazing commons are typically places where users are
embedded in collective governance regimes with rights prescribed by
norms or other rules. Such a place is also termed a commons. As
scholars pointed out, a well-managed commons of this type would
produce not tragedy but something more like its opposite. 15 It could
11. The distinction is explained and applied in MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE
EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7–8, 51–55, 65–67 (1988). Earlier
considerations, many in the field of welfare economics, include Stephen Marglin, The Social Rate of
Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment, 77 Q. J. ECON. 95 (1963).
12. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1243 (“A finite world can support only a
finite population . . . .”).
13. The term “commons” is explained in Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 7.
14. On fisheries, see Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Learning How to Fish: Catch
Shares and the Future of Fisheries Conservation, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 150 (2013). In the
case of the atmosphere, Mary Christina Wood has urged that it be embraced legally as a public trust
asset with state duties to protect it in the public interest. Mary Christina Wood, Law and Climate
Change: Government’s Atmospheric Trust Responsibility, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10652
(2008). Hardin viewed the atmosphere in the same way, realized that it could not be divided into
private shares, and urged that mutual coercion be applied to protect it. Hardin, supra note 1, at
1245, 1247.
15. Leading studies of commons that have been well-managed, sometimes for centuries,
include ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) and Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A Comparative
Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resources Management, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL.
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yield maximum benefits for the grazers, better even than if the
commons were divided into separate geographic shares, with nothing
like the decline that Hardin predicted.
This terminology objection, of course, did not really challenge
anything Hardin had said. Indeed, he had expressly noted that users
could avoid the tragedy by embracing a coercive management
system. 16 The problem, then, was not with Hardin but with
simplistic interpretations of this tale, particularly by readers who
liked the idea of fragmenting nature into privately owned shares. A
commons led to tragedy while privatization led to lasting
productivity; that was the simplistic interpretation, one which
students of real-life, successful grazing arrangements found
wrongheaded. 17
A more general concern about Hardin’s use of the term looked
to his implicit claim that a commons was in some way a special kind
of place. It was a place that had not been divided into private shares.
When a commons was divided, when each part of it had a distinct
owner, then it was no longer a commons. Hardin, we might note,
did not say this exactly. Indeed, his population example pointed in a
rather different direction, to the view that the entire earth remained
a commons despite fragmentation into nations and private shares. 18
But again, Hardin’s story was useful to many types of readers and it
was easy to distinguish, using his grazing tale, between landscapes
that were divided into private shares and those that were not. Only
the latter were subject to tragic misuse.
One objection to this interpretation (that is, to the claim that
privatization solves the tragedy) is that it overlooks ecological
interconnections. What happens on one parcel is linked to physical
conditions elsewhere given flows of air, water, wildlife, and nutrients.
One landowner is enough to break up a wildlife migration corridor.
One landowner can alter drainage in ways that substantially disturb
downward owners. To the extent of interconnections, unseen ones as
well as the seen, a landscape remains a commons even after its division.

247 (1992). A positive view of the commons is presented in Anna di Robilant, The Virtues of
Common Ownership, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1359 (2011).
16. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247.
17. E.g., OSTROM, supra note 15, at 12–13, passim.
18. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1243. In addition, Hardin made clear that landscapes divided
into shares of privately owned land remained a commons with respect to water and air that carried
away pollution. Id. at 1245.
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A related objection is that landowners everywhere participate
routinely in an economic commons when they produce goods or
services for the market, competing for customers who move about as
freely as cattle. 19 Here we can consider the typical city in which
owners of gas stations or drug stores compete for customers,
establishing businesses in new locations in a never-ending quest for
market share. The competition is plainly wasteful; there is no need
for similar gas stations or drugs stores adjacent to one another. And
waste means ecological cost—tragedy—in some place, somewhere.
Further, people living in the area are forced to drive by the
competing businesses, and countless ones like them, traveling further
distances simply to get where they want. City needs could be
adequately met with fewer gas stations and drug stores, particularly
abandoned ones. Too many of them populate the urban area, which
remains a commons, despite its fragmented land ownership, due to
the flows of goods, services, workers, and customers.
The same lesson about overuse is illustrated in the cases of oil
fields and groundwater aquifers. Oil producers can often exploit an
entire field using only one or a few wells. 20 Water pumpers can access
an aquifer with similar efficiency. 21 When the overlying land, though,
is owned by large numbers of people and each has the right to install
a well, the number of wells can quickly become excessive and
wasteful. In the case of oil wells, too rapid pumping by too many
wells can reduce overall output by releasing pressure too quickly. If
we view the underlying oil deposit or aquifer as the common asset,
one can argue that it has not been divided into private shares simply
19. The urban setting is considered in Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the Urban Commons,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995 (2012) and Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (2011). Garnett and Foster pay attention chiefly to the urban spaces that
are not privately owned. My example considers a city as a whole without regard for ownership of
particular parts; the city as such remains a commons given the interconnection of its parts and the
ways the conduct of one actor affects others. A related line of scholarship considers municipalities as
actors within larger spatial scales. See, e.g., Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State
Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012).
20. The typical tools to reduce the waste of too many wells are rules limiting well spacing and
setting minimum tract sizes for each well, together with unitization procedures that allow for the
management of entire fields as single production operations. 1 WALTER L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF
OIL & GAS 267–72 (2004 and 2014 Supp.).
21. Texas is among the states that have sought to reduce inefficiency in groundwater
extraction—and to conserve water in the process—in part by using well-spacing, well-production,
and other rules long common in oil and gas fields. See Heather Welles, Note, Toward a Management
Doctrine for Texas Groundwater, 40 ECOLOGY L. Q. 483, 491–94 (2013).
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because the overlying land is fragmented. This is true enough, but
what it illustrates is that division of lands into private shares almost
never brings the commons to a full end. So long as private parcels
are not completely sealed off, with no spillover effects among
them—including no movement of people or goods among them—
then features of a commons remain. A city remains a commons so
long as people and their things freely move among competing
locations, much as oil and water migrate among wells.
Hardin’s tale, in short, is not usefully read as a story about a
special kind of place known as a commons, a place distinguishable
from other places that are privately owned. Pretty much all lands and
resources face the dangers of tragic misuse whenever and to the
extent activities unfolding on them trigger effects elsewhere. As for
sealing off each parcel so that spillover effects end, the idea pushed
to its fullness is nonsense. People need to come and go, as do the
goods they produce and need. The health of lands everywhere
depends on ecological systems and processes that necessarily
transcend boundaries. To sever or disrupt them is to invite tragedy,
not avert it.
Put simply, a commons exists in any setting characterized by
interconnection and interdependence, whether ecological or social,
which is to say essentially everywhere.
III. PRIVATIZATION AS A SOLUTION
Hardin’s discussion of the solutions to his tragedy is subject to
more direct challenge because of his too-easy assumption that the
simple division of the grazing commons would end misuse. Hardin
did not dwell on the point; he offered the observation mostly as an
aside. But it was a claim that many readers found congenial,
particularly readers who disliked government and viewed the market
as a superior mechanism for resource-use decisions. 22
The falsity of this stance is easy enough to see simply by looking
to landscapes in private hands. Overgrazing afflicts private lands as
well as public ones. Private farmlands have long suffered from soil
erosion and degradation. In the American Midwest, farmers on
private lands routinely spread fertilizers and pesticides, leading not
22. Privatization as the preferred solution is critically considered in OSTROM, supra note 15,
at 12–15, and Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution,
78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 533 (2007).

1422

06.FREYFOGLE.FIN-FIXED (DO NOT DELETE)

1415

2/2/2016 7:26 PM

A Good that Transcends

just to topsoil degradation and declines in soil biological diversity
but to massive problems in waterways (dead zones most vividly).
Too often owners of private forests have clear-cut them in ways that
cause soil declines, siltation, fish kills, and other ill effects.
There are, in fact, a wide range of reasons why owners of private
lands do not and sometimes cannot take good care of them. 23 The
owners could be unaware of the effects of what they are doing, given
that many harms are invisible, distant or slow-emerging. They could
act based on strong competitive pressures or simply know no other
way to behave. An overall culture of land misuse can exude an aura
of legitimacy, carried forward by tradition and aided by
misinformation dispensed retail by (for instance) equipment and
materiel suppliers. Rational actors could use a discount rate for
future costs and benefits that lead to exploitation today with the
proceeds then invested elsewhere in higher-yielding assets. A short
time-horizon might also be used for other reasons—simply the
advanced age of the land user, for instance. The reasons are many,
and have long been known.
Aside from these general causes of private-land misuses, there are
the causes that are worsened when the commons is divided into
smaller shares. Division increases the number and length of property
boundaries, thus worsening problems related to externalities. Any
division of a landscape increases the challenges of coordinating land
uses at large spatial scales so as to address problems that can only be
remedied at such scales (for example, protecting wildlife
populations, 24 controlling excessive drainage or land-cover change, 25
and managing river floodplains 26). To break a landscape into smaller
pieces adds to these problems, making it even more difficult to
coordinate activities and lessening the powers of individuals acting
alone to achieve good land use, even when they try.
23. A vivid and thoughtfully probed historical inquiry is DONALD WORSTER, THE DUST
BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S (1979) (exploring the cultural origins of misuses of
private lands). I comment on the issue in ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH: IMAGES FOR
OUR PLANETARY SURVIVAL 26–42 (1993).
24. The science and policy challenges of protecting species, particularly imperiled ones, are
considered in REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE’S LEGACY: PROTECTING
AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY (1994).
25. One useful inquiry is David K. Mears & Sarah McKearnan, Rivers and Resilience: Lessons
Learned from Tropical Storm Irene, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 177 (2012).
26. One thoughtful study is J.B. Ruhl, et al., Proposal for a Model State Watershed
Management Act, 33 ENVTL. L. 929, 931 (2003).
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The division of an open-access commons into privately
controlled shares can diminish overuse; that much is true and useful.
But it by no means ensures good land use and in not insignificant
ways can make that goal more elusive. The difficulties increase when
the users acting in concert compare privatization with the option of
commons governance. In the grazing setting, for instance, herdsmen
in an undivided landscape can use rotational methods that allow
them to respond flexibly to variations in range conditions over time
and give sensitive areas long rests. This option becomes more
difficult, even infeasible, when a landscape is cut into small pieces.
IV. THE ONE SOLUTION
In Hardin’s view, as noted, the solution to the tragedy was
some version of mutual coercion mutually agreed upon. 27A quick
read of his article, though, can give one the sense that he had two
solutions in mind, as to some extent he did—government
ownership with regulatory control and the private property
alternative. For many readers, these came across as solutions that
differed in kind, and lots of them much favored the latter. 28
In fact, however, the private-property approach is merely a form
of mutual coercion mutually agreed upon, and not necessarily much
different from overtly regulatory approaches. To see this point one
has to pause to consider how property arises and how it operates
over time.
Mythology aside, private property is entirely a social creation. 29 It
arises when a group of people agree among themselves in some
way—perhaps democratically but perhaps with elites giving orders—
to divide up uses of a landscape in some fashion and to allocate use
rights to individuals and families or other groups. Property is a
highly flexible institution in that widely varied things can be subject
to ownership with rights and limits of ownership that vary just as
widely. To create a property scheme, then, a law-making community
needs to make key decisions, especially on the basics: what can be
owned, how rights will be defined, how norms will be enforced, and
27. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247.
28. Scholarly works strongly favoring privatization include Adler & Stewart, supra note 14
(for fisheries management), and Jan G. Laitos & Rachel B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503 (2008) (wilderness areas).
29. Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beerman, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CANADIAN J.
OF L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1993).
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what powers lawmakers will retain to change rules over time and to
reclaim property (expropriate it) for the common good. 30 Property
rights can give owners exclusive or near-exclusive rights to use
particular, bounded geographic places. Or they can vest owners with
specific rights to use particular places while other owners enjoy rights
to use the same places in different ways. Property rights can vary
greatly in duration, and owners may or may not gain rights to
transfer their property to new owners or to shift to different uses. In
some way, property law needs to make rights available to the first
owners—to allocate the property—and the possible allocation
methods are numerous. 31
These widely varied options to create private property are
usefully compared with what is commonly thought of as the
opposing option: government ownership with regulatory control. 32
This latter option also involves government coming up with a legal
scheme controlling use of the landscape. To that extent, the options
are the same. A government-run system could involve use of the
landscape by people working for the government itself or for
community members collectively. This option, if chosen, would
differ noticeably from many of the private-property variants. More
likely, though, a government would retain control but make tailored
rights to use the landscape available to private actors, much as, on
federal lands in the United States, grazing, mining, and timber
harvesting are all done by private actors. When this latter approach is
selected, the differences between the private-property and
government-regulation options narrow further. Indeed, they can
narrow to the point where the two options differ only in details. In
30. I consider the many options available to lawmakers when crafting property systems in
ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 11–
36 (2003).
31. A concise summary of the issues appears in ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C.
KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 393–96 (2012);
see also id. at 312–14 for the options for resolving disputes among owners.
32. The ideas set forth in this paragraph and the next are developed at length in Eric T.
Freyfogle, Good-bye to the Public-Private Divide, in AGRARIANISM AND THE GOOD SOCIETY: LAND,
CULTURE, CONFLICT, AND HOPE 83–106 (2007). The line is also blurred considerably in proposals
for laws that facilitate private action to govern particular neighborhoods or landscapes. See e.g.,
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L. J. 75 (1998); Robert H.
Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property
Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (1999). Adding further complexity is
the frequent existence of multiple levels of governance. Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The
Keystone of Nested Commons Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007 (2012).
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both instances, laws set the terms of use rights. In both instances,
systems are backed by state enforcement powers. In both instances,
private actors have legally secure use rights and they are the ones
who engage in the profit-seeking land uses.
Indeed, when the various land-governance options are all set out
(or a sufficient number and variety of them), they form not two
categories of public property and private property but something like
an unbroken continuum of rights and land-use arrangements,
varying (on one end) from public land used only by government and
off limits to private actors (a sensitive defense installation, for
instance), to private land in a remote rural location with nearly no
land-use controls and few spillover effects. In between these poles
would be variations on the scope and nature of private use rights and
in the retained government powers to revise the terms of the use
rights over time and to redirect resources to different uses and users.
Private property is based on the exercise of government power in
the sense that laws and police are what compel people to respect one
another’s private rights. It rests, that is, on sovereign power, not on
some power source arising apart from government. And it is based,
just as much as any other government regulation, on coercion. To vest
rights in one landowner is to restrict coercively, by state action, the
liberties of all other people. 33
V. THE CHALLENGES OF AVOIDING THE TRAGEDY
Hardin cannot be faulted for the idea that the private-property
remedy somehow differs in kind rather than degree from the
regulatory option. He might be faulted, though, for not saying more
about the grave difficulties involved in setting up any coercive
regime, one that allows intensive uses of a landscape but keeps the
uses within proper bounds; a regime that allows full use but
somehow forestalls abuse. In reality, the work involved in this lawmaking or norm-creating is quite considerable. It is hardly enough
simply to draw lines on a map, dividing a landscape into shares. Far
more labor is needed to craft workable rules and to enforce them
overtime. The challenges in doing this are many, and they arise in
every land and resource setting. They can be particularly acute in
settings where nature itself is highly dynamic and when (as often)

33.
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actions by one person directly affect both other people and the
resource itself, understood in ecological context.
As an initial matter, it seems obligatory in any setting to start
with the basic distinction between the legitimate use of nature and
the misuse of it. How should lawmakers differentiate the two? This
is, as noted, a normative task, and a challenging one when done
wisely and morally; when it takes into account, as it should, the full
range of factors relevant to it. 34
This line-drawing is a necessary element in any rights-allocation
system because, for reasons mentioned, market forces and human
nature are not such that a community can expect individual users
voluntarily to stay on the right side of the use-abuse line. If a
community really wants to halt misuse, then it needs to tailor use
rights under any scheme so as to allow legitimate uses and disallow
all misuses (Hardin’s main point). A legal scheme need not rely
solely on prohibitions of misuse, particularly in the case of land- or
resource-use harms that entail what might be termed carryingcapacity harms: actions that are harmful only when too many people
engage in them. 35 In that setting and others, lawmakers could use
other management tools, perhaps involving economic incentives,
perhaps instead involving efforts to nurture and strengthen social
norms. 36 Still, a line must be drawn, which means, somehow, doing
the work of drawing it. This work is likely to call for considerable
ecological knowledge, as well as mature thought on the various
relevant normative factors. The need for ecological knowledge in
turn can require extensive scientific study.
With this line-drawing done (for the time being), the next step is
to craft use rights so that they allow land and resource uses
consistent with it. In the case of highly varied landscapes, this will
likely mean tailoring the use rights to nature itself so as to allow uses
that are ecologically sound and to limit those that are not. The
guiding principle here would be rights that are based on nature in
the sense that they take natural features into account. 37 Opposed to
34. I explore the challenge in ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF NATURE:
MAKING SENSE OF OUR OLDEST TASK (forthcoming University of Chicago Press, 2016).
35. Hardin’s examples all qualify as actions that are harmful only when too many people
engage in them. I consider the issue in FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 221.
36. A useful consideration of options is Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts,
and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land in Cultural and Psychological
Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423.
37. FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 203–27.
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this—to highlight the point—are property rights defined abstractly,
as with the hypothetical Greenacre or Blackacre: rights defined with
no regard for natural features or for the effects of a given resourceuse in a particular place. 38 This work too may be quite challenging.
And, again, it needs to be done under any coercive option, whether
termed private property or government control. It needs to be done,
that is, if the goal (as assumed) is to avoid abuse entirely and if the
community of users is not so close-knit, and so well-guided
internally, that individual owners (contra Hardin’s tale) can be
counted on to avoid bad actions on their own.
Making this tailoring job more difficult is nature’s dynamism and
the fact that human actions themselves inevitably change the parts of
nature being used. 39 Change in physical conditions in turn means, in
dialectical fashion, changes in the future uses that will be permissible
under the new conditions. Also shifting will be prevailing ideas about
good land use—about the line drawn between use and abuse—shifts
that could occur because of new factual knowledge but could also
occur due to evolving communal needs and values. 40 The factors
interact in a kind of multi-factor dynamism, one that can prove
especially knotty in the case of biological resources (fish, for
instance) where populations are subject to wide natural variations
and where the capture of one species can distort populations of other
species. 41It can prove knotty also due to variations in weather
patterns—drought, flooding, extreme temperatures—and to natural
disturbance regimes such as fire.
In some way lawmakers charged with the task of crafting private use
rights need to take this dynamism into account. They could do so by
erring on the side of great caution, by allowing year in and year out only
those limited land uses that would respect the land’s ecological health

38. I challenge this perspective in ERIC F. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING
COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 12–26 (2007).
39. The challenges posed by nature itself are considered in Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J.
189 (2002).
40. A classic historical study of the dialectical interaction of nature and culture, and how it
plays out in terms of property-use systems, is WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS,
COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983).
41. These challenges and many others are considered in Boyce Thorne-Miller, Setting the
Right Goals: Marine Fisheries and Sustainability in Large Ecosystems, in PRECAUTIONARY TOOLS FOR
RESHAPING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 155 (NANCY J. MYERS & CAROLYN RAFFENSPERGER,
EDS., 2006).

1428

06.FREYFOGLE.FIN-FIXED (DO NOT DELETE)

1415

2/2/2016 7:26 PM

A Good that Transcends

under any and all foreseeable landscape conditions. That approach,
however, is likely to be rejected as much too cautious. The alternative is
to allow more intensive use levels but to embed into the private rights
some mechanism to curtail use levels when needed to respond to these
dynamic factors. A fishery is again a good example: harvest levels need
to vary with natural fluctuations in target-species populations. Various
methods could be used to build-in this responsiveness. All of them,
though, require ongoing monitoring, data collection, and adjustments
to use levels. All of them require ongoing involvement in managing use
levels at the landscape (or fishery) level. It is not enough under any
option for lawmakers to set usage levels once and for all and then walk
away. In short, a property-rights approach requires ongoing
manipulation, just as does the regulatory option, if it is really going to
avert overuse.
To get to this point is to see that the property-rights and
regulatory approaches may not be all that different. Of course they
could be quite different in a particular setting. Lawmakers taking a
property-rights approach could define private use-rights in clear,
unchanging terms, without making them responsive in any way to
shifting natural conditions. But by doing that, they give up the
power to protect the resource against overuse. Their lawmaking
might still reduce Hardin’s tragedy but would not eliminate it. To
gain full protection, the property-rights approach would need to take
shapes that rather closely resemble the regulatory option, perhaps
quite closely.
In the end, the work required to create a property-rights system
might not be all that much less or different from the work needed to
run a successful regulatory system. 42 Both require extensive, sensitive
efforts by lawmakers that attend closely to ecological facts. Both
require lawmakers to resist pressures by user groups to authorize
higher use-levels than are consistent with the avoidance of overuse.
Can lawmakers be counted on to do this? Are they likely to resist
pressures to set permissible use-levels too high? Probably not, most
would say; surely not, others would contend. Biased lawmaking is
indeed a danger if not a high probability. But it is a danger, we need
to see, under both the property-rights and the regulatory approaches.
The property-rights approach might lessen this problem somewhat

42.
174–77.

I consider the similarities and identify differences in FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at
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but the problem hardly goes away. In this light, is there reason why
we might have greater confidence in lawmakers when they are
specifying the elements of property rights (wearing one hat) than
when they are crafting more overtly regulatory tools (wearing a
different but similar hat)? Is it sensible to blast regulators as
incompetent but then expect them (or their statute-writing
colleagues) to do vastly better when it comes to specifying
property rights?
VI. ROOT CAUSES, AGAIN
In Hardin’s simple story, the grazers overuse the pasture because
they want to increase their individual short-term profits. That motive
is not merely the primary one; it is, apparently, the only one, with no
other factors in supporting roles. 43 Hardin’s explanation has obvious
merit to it; profit is patently a strong lure. But as a summary of the
root causes of degradation—of the factors and reasons why humans
misuse nature—it is nowhere near complete. The factors at work
could well be quite numerous, especially when we consider many
settings. We need to identify and trace these other causal factors
before Hardin’s tale can stand as more than a crude explanation of
why people act as they do.
What other factors might be at work in a grazing story such
as Hardin’s? 44

43. This view of human behavior is explored and criticized in Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1053–55 (2000).
44. The question as posed implicitly raises foundational questions: Why do humans degrade
nature? What are the root causes of our misguided acts? The literature on the subject is far less
developed than it should be given the importance of the questions and the need ultimately for
solutions that address root causes. Thoughtful comments on our overall plight are offered in
DONALD WORSTER, THE WEALTH OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND THE ECOLOGICAL
IMAGINATION 3–63 (1993). A critique of market capitalism as a cause of degradation is presented in
FRED MAGDOFF & JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER, WHAT EVERY ENVIRONMENTALIST NEEDS TO KNOW
ABOUT CAPITALISM (2011). I develop my views on root causes in FREYFOGLE, supra note 34.
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One possibility, already mentioned, is that a grazer might act in
ignorance, whether about the carrying capacity of the land or about
the numbers and grazing plans of fellow grazers. Hardin looks down
on his created scene from above, knowing all. Grazers on the ground
might know a lot less. Related to this, the grazer might disagree
about what qualifies as overgrazing—or, more generally, about
where to draw the line between legitimate use and abuse.
As for the selfish drive for short-term profits, an individual grazer
might be inclined to resist it. But what is the consequence for an
individual grazer who refrains from adding more cows? If the
consequence is that the grazer thereby improves pasture conditions
then the grazer might hold back. But to bring about Hardin’s
tragedy we do not need every grazer to be selfish. Not every grazer
needs to make the calculation that Hardin presumes. We probably
need only a few grazers, maybe just one. One aggressive grazer alone
might add enough animals to degrade the entire pasture. 45
This possibility gives reason to modify Hardin’s simplistic story.
A conscientious grazer who wants to avoid overgrazing and is willing
to do his part is put in a bind. Yes, the grazer can refrain from
adding animals. But if the tragedy is going to take place anyway, if
other grazers can ruin the land without his help, what is the benefit?
There no longer is the tradeoff of either higher short-term profits
and a degraded pasture or lower profits and a healthier pasture. The
landscape will decline in any event. So what is the point of
holding back?
A grazer who appraises the situation this way and then, perhaps
with resignation, goes ahead to add cattle, is not acting selfishly, not
in any full sense. His situation is akin to that of the nature lover who
wants to see a wilderness area left untouched but has no power to
keep others from altering it. The person might then go ahead and
invade the wilderness, despite wanting it protected, simply because
others will do so anyway. To refrain might be virtuous in the sense of
reflecting good character. But it is not ethically required under any
ethical system based either on rights or consequences. 46
45. Hardin introduced this line of reasoning in the context of population growth to explain
why the challenge could not be met simply by appealing to the consciences of individuals as such.
Hardin, supra note 1, at 1246–47.
46. The various strands of ethical thought relating to our uses of nature are considered and
synthesized in a dated but still useful source, BRYAN G. NORTON, TOWARD UNITY AMONG
ENVIRONMENTALISTS (1991).
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To these possible motivations for overgrazing we can quickly add
others, many of them that also explain abusive practices by private
landowners. 47 A grazer could simply be short-sighted and not care
about the future or could use a high discount rate that reduces the
weight given to future harms when compared with present gains.
The simple fact that the grazer is willing to push the land to its limits
to meet human wants (rather than acting more cautiously), and the
fact that he views land and animals as objects of manipulation (and
not, in the case of the cattle, as fellow creatures), also play
explanatory roles in the chain of events. As best we can tell, Hardin’s
grazers view their landscape simply as a place to raise cattle; it is not a
multiple-use land that might produce varied benefits. As for the
always-important economics, we know nothing about the grazers
and how they are faring. Might they need extra money to feed
hungry families or to pay impatient tax collectors? Knowing as little
as we do about the context, it is presumptuous to guess motives and
judge conduct. Starving people do not steal food because they
are selfish.
Another key part of this whole tragic saga, again implicit in it but
not highlighted, has to do with the market in which these grazers are
apparently embedded. A grazer who raises ever more cattle to make
money is likely raising them to sell. To note the presence of a market
and the chance to make money in it is to bring in another key causal
factor. Take the market away and the overgrazing might even end. 48
Then we have the question that has loomed above Hardin’s tale
from the beginning, the question that should have been, for decades
now, at the center of discussions about Hardin’s tragedy. If his
grazers could have come together collectively to develop a
management plan, benefiting all of them, why did they not do it?
Why did they continue competing as autonomous individuals rather
than cooperating for shared gain? In an important sense, the real
cause of the tragedy is precisely this: the failure of the grazers to
communicate, to get together, and to act sensibly. So why did they
fail to cooperate?
To raise this issue is to highlight yet again how ignorant we
are about this simple grazing commons and to see how this
47. FREYFOGLE, supra note 23, at 26–42.
48. The argument is developed in MAGDOFF & FOSTER, supra note 44, and CHRIS
WILLIAMS, ECOLOGY AND SOCIALISM: SOLUTIONS TO CAPITALIST ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 226 (2010)
(“[I]t is the economic system that dictates that nonsustainability is rational, not people.”).
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ignorance can (and does) readily lead to mistaken assumptions.
As possible answers to these questions—as explanations why
competing grazers might fail to communicate and work
together—it is easy to round up some likely suspects: 49
•

The bad communication could stem from differences
among the grazers themselves: differences in
language, ethnicity, religious, race, and so on.

•

It could be due to membership in different political
or tribal groups that do not get along.

•

The grazing region could be (probably is) a
borderland where group competition plays out;
historically these are the grazing regions most
often misused.

•

Perhaps the prevailing political and social culture is
weakened by oppression with talk among people
stifled by fears of informers, secret police or
organized crime.

•

If grazers are taxed for each animal they own they
may just refuse to talk about their herd sizes and to
question others about theirs.

•

Finally, the grazers might simply feel helpless and
resigned. They may assume that any arrangement they
concoct will collapse under pressure from outside
powers—from powerful cattle buyers (global
corporations?), for instance, driven by neoliberal agendas.50

All of these possibilities need to be placed on the table as causes
of landscape tragedies. Tellingly, none of them appears in Hardin’s
49. A thoughtful inquiry is Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000).
50. Such fears might be well grounded in the realities of the settings in which interested
parties come together. Discussions could be skewed to favor particular interests that wield
disproportionate power. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combatting the Politics of Power in
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005). Similarly, the processes of engagement could be
ones that are so drawn out, and so costly for the participants, that only the best-funded interests can
stay engaged. John D. Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River Collaborative Watershed
Planning Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 559 (2001). More generally,
cooperation that takes place through institutions is subject to the limitations of such institutions; the
topic is surveyed in Daniel H. Cole, The Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 383.
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simple story. For us to interject any of them requires that we add
facts to his tale (thereby making it more plausible). There is one big
causal factor, though, that is present in Hardin’s narrative without
any need to add complexity. This is the inclination of his fictional
characters simply to look after themselves as individuals, ignoring
everyone else. Each grazer, Hardin tells us, responds solely to the
costs and benefits he incurs as an individual. It is a culture of go-italone; a culture in which individuals look at their neighbors as
competitors, not colleagues. As Chris Williams has pointed out,
Hardin presents this motive as “a transhistorical fact.” He describes
as rational “the very thing that traditional herdsmen and peasants
sharing ‘common’ lands historically avoid.” 51
For the grazers in Hardin’s story to act as they should have, for
them to have come together and developed a pasture-management
scheme, they needed to live and work within a culture that expected
and nurtured cooperation. 52 They required a home culture in which
people acted as citizens or community members as well as market
participants. Further, they required a culture—if they were to sustain
healthy pastures—that generated and shared ecological wisdom
about landscapes and that included vocabulary suitable for talking
about it. The ideal of land health, or something like it, would need
to stand as a matter of common concern, suitable for common
resolution. Finally, the culture needed to view collective action,
through some sort of governmental means, as a legitimate way for
people to pursue their aims. It could not be a culture in which
people treated government as the enemy. It could not be a culture in
which land abusers could ward off critics by raising high the shield of
individual liberty. 53

51. WILLIAMS, supra note 48, at 43–44.
52. This point, and those made in the next three sentences, appear prominently in the many
writings of Wendell Berry, e.g., Conservation and Local Economy, in WENDELL BERRY, SEX,
ECONOMY, FREEDOM & COMMUNITY 3–18 (1993).
53. Beyond these points, users of the commons would typically need to develop governance
arrangements that responded to the various forces that could undercut successful commons
management. The traits of successful commons-management arrangements are surveyed in OSTROM,
supra note 15, at 58–102. Ostrom usefully probes the complex motives of individual users of
commons in A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1 (1998).
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A land-respecting culture can certainly embrace private
property. 54 But it cannot view private rights as so strong and
inflexible that cooperation among owners occurs only by
unanimous agreement. If private rights are inflexible, if grazers can
halt overgrazing only when everyone agrees, then a single dissenter
can frustrate everything. In short, strong private rights—whether
or not phrased in property terms—can quickly cause ruin, even
when nearly everyone wants to avoid it. And it is hardly fair to say
that people who value land health simply need to pay abusers
enough to get them to stop. Why should they bear such a burden? 55
The larger issue here, to reiterate, has to do with the root causes
of tragedy-inducing behavior. This tragedy, like all environmental
problems, is brought on by human action. The search to learn why
people misbehave should thus be central to any inquiry into our
environmental plight. Hardin cannot be faulted much for largely
ignoring the issue; for assuming simplistically that overgrazing stems
from one factor. But commentary on it, and certainly commentary
on our environmental plight generally, has been much weakened by a
failing to put this issue front and center, although important
exceptions, to be sure, exist. 56 Yes, when a market exists and people
desire to get ahead they take steps that make them money. To that
extent Hardin’s tale is well grounded. But in a culture that honors
land health—one that facilitates discussion on key normative issues,
that encourages cooperation as well as competition, and that views
government as the people’s agent for shared work—the profit motive
might fade in significance. 57

54. Wendell Berry, Private Property and the Common Wealth, in BERRY, ANOTHER TURN OF
46–63 (1995).
55. The issue is considered in John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to
Protect the Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES &ENVTL. L. 1 (2005). Payment to land owners to
avoid harmful activities also undercuts the moral legitimacy of private property rights in nature.
FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 105–30.
56. Still high on the list of penetrating cultural critiques is Aldo Leopold’s classic work, A
SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (1949), an extended meditation on the
new ways of seeing and valuing nature that people needed to embrace if they were to live well on
land in the long run. Perhaps Leopold’s most concise depiction of this new world view appears in his
The Farmer as a Conservationist, in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS BY
ALDO LEOPOLD 255 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott, eds., 1991) (originally published 1939).
Leopold’s thought is most carefully surveyed in JULIANNE LUTZ NEWTON, ALDO LEOPOLD’S
ODYSSEY: REDISCOVERING THE AUTHOR OF A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (2006).
57. A vibrant civil society is likely also a prerequisite. Julianne Lutz Newton & William C.
Sullivan, Nature, Culture, and Civil Society, 1 J. CIV. SOC’Y 195 (2005).
THE CRANK
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Today’s culture of liberal individualism includes and gives
priority to cultural elements that are root causes of ecological
degradation. 58 It features cultural elements that foster land-use
tragedies while frustrating efforts to halt them. Particularly in its
liberty-loving, anti-government forms, liberal individualism
undercuts efforts to see landscapes as ecological wholes and to think
normatively about their conditions and prospects. It holds high the
rights of individuals to go it alone like Hardin’s grazers so long as
they respect the rights of others to go it alone also. As Hardin
illustrated, this is a culture that leads readily if not inexorably to
disaster. Responsible libertarians, to be sure, call for compliance with
laws, property law especially. But the culture they press forward is a
culture that frustrates good lawmaking, including, importantly, the
lawmaking required to come up with new well-crafted
property rights.
When mutual coercion is the only solution to avoid tragedy, as it
is in setting after setting, a culture that despises and resists such
coercion—a culture that presses hard to keep it from happening and,
when it does take place, views the lawmaking arena as simply another
venue for individuals as such to get ahead—is a culture that is driven
to ruin. The work of mutual coercion, of crafting collective
management schemes, is difficult even when all participants support
it and bring to the table their best inner selves. When many of them
instead do all that they can to undercut it and/or to manipulate
rule-making to benefit themselves—when the culture they embrace
views such self-seeking behavior as simply vigorous competition—
then the path to hope becomes yet darker and more treacherous.
VII. NAMING THE TRAGEDY
The title Garret Hardin gave to his essay did not really name the
tragedy that took place in his grazing landscape (or in his
overpopulated world). Rather, his title seemed to identity where the
tragedy occurred. But Hardin does imply that his tragedy unfolds
because the pasture is not governed by an effective landmanagement regime, by some version of mutual coercion mutually
agreed upon. It is the absence of good laws that is the problem, and
a new legal arrangement, he tells us, is the only solution. In that
light, his title identifies not just the place of the tragedy but also its
58. FREYFOGLE, supra note 34.
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cause. Government (assuming it exists) is to blame for not
adequately controlling the self-seeking individuals.
One might readily object to this shifting of causal responsibility.
A well-constructed legal regime is the solution to the problem, not
its cause. The grazers bring on the overgrazing themselves. The true
causes of the tragedy are the forces and factors that lead the grazers
to act as they do rather than in other, more responsible ways.
Government is not to blame, nor, really, is the commons itself, even
if we could somehow view nature as an active agent in the unfolding
drama. When the commons is used by people who collectively want
to use it well and who have the knowledge, skills, and opportunity to
do so, then (and only then) does the outcome brighten.
If we want an apt name for Hardin’s narrative, then, we need to
look in another direction. An apt title would be one that summedup, in a few words, the key cause of the misbehavior. As for that, the
possible titles are many, and it might prove helpful to debate their
relative merits as an avenue for probing the likely causal factors.
One place to turn for a new name is to Bernard Mandeville’s
eighteenth-century classic work, much liked by libertarians and
market enthusiasts, The Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick
Benefits. 59 Mandeville was an early advocate of the view, later
connected with Adam Smith, that linked energetic money-making
efforts to economic growth that benefited the public generally.
Mandeville’s thinking, of course, is best understood in the context of
his worldview and its distinct (and now ignored) assumptions about
a binding moral order. But we can put his age aside and take
inspiration from his title. Hardin’s tale might be termed “The Fable
of the Cows: Or Private Vices, Public Decline.”
As noted, the overgrazing in Hardin’s tale is also closely linked,
essentially so perhaps, to the unmentioned market in cattle. Take
away that market, take away the grazers’ tendency to view cattle as
capital assets, and the overgrazing would diminish if not end. We
could thus consider, as a second option for the title, “The Tragedy of
Market Capitalism.” 60 If selected, this phrasing might prompt readers
to see links between tragedies of the type Hardin described and
59. BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK
th
BENEFITS (J. Johnson, ed., 6 ed. 1732). The volume remains in print from various publishers. It
originally appeared in differing editions between 1714 and 1732.
60. The argument is made by various writers including MAGDOFF & FOSTER, supra note 44,
and WILLIAMS, supra note, at 48.
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other instances of wastefulness and degradation brought on by the
vigorous pursuit of profits. Detroit, Michigan, could supply ready
facts for several illustrations. Variations of this title could draw
attention to particular elements of the market, to its
commodification of nature, for instance, or to the short-term
perspective that it invites and rewards.
One might be tempted as a further option to choose a title that
gets at the selfish individualism involved in Hardin’s tragedy, at what
might be termed the cussed individualism. But we need to be careful
with this phrasing, tempting though it is. In Hardin’s tale, the
grazers as individuals would have been better off had they worked
together. The problem—in this setting, though not in all—was thus
not the grazers’ presumed desire to flourish economically. It was,
more exactly, their failure to pursue that goal by working in tandem.
An accurate name would need to get at this particular aspect of
individualism, the “go-it-alone” version of individualism, the kind of
individualism that fails to recognize how a responsible person plays
many social roles with expectations of good conduct attached
to them.
Two years before Hardin’s article came out, the economist
Alfred Kahn wrote a rather similar article that highlighted the same
problem. Kahn’s article drew less popular attention, very possibly,
one might guess, because he phrased the issue in a way that many
readers liked far less. Kahn’s essay was entitled “The Tyranny of
Small Decisions.” 61 It highlighted how individuals who made
decisions in isolation, even acting in economically rational ways,
could drag down the communities to which they belonged. When
people stood apart, when they chose or were compelled to act in
isolation, their individual “small” decisions brought harm to the
whole. This title was later picked up by an ecologist, William Odum,
who explained how it linked to ecological degradation. 62
Kahn’s title was far more apt than Hardin’s in terms of
highlighting the cause of the bad outcome. It pointed a finger
more directly at the individual grazers—it was their decisions that
brought on the harm, not any failing of government—and
emphasized that the problem had to do with their isolation or
61. Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and the
Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23 (1966).
62. William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 32
BIOSCIENCE 728 (1982).
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autonomy. So long as the grazers acted alone, not together, their
decisions were bad ones. Kahn’s title, then, could be recycled.
Hardin’s tale is very much one in which small decisions exerted
destructive power; it too showed the tyranny that they could
bring on.
Small decisions become more likely when a landscape is divided
into many small pieces and when management of the pieces is turned
over to individual owners. As Hardin points out, the division of the
landscape into private shares might well diminish the harms that
unfold in a pasture that is completely uncontrolled. 63 Privatization is
a step in a good direction. But it is only a step and it is unlikely to
sustain the landscape’s long-term productivity. For reasons
mentioned, fragmentation can leave key problems unaddressed. And
it can make many forms of good land use more difficult. To get at
these problems we might then select as a new title something like
“The Tragedy of Fragmentation.” 64 Like the Tragedy of Market
Capitalism, this title also has broader usage. It can refer, not just to
the fragmentation of landscapes in physical senses, but to other
forms of fragmentation: to views of nature as a collection of pieces
and parts rather than integrated ecological systems; to views of
humans as distinct autonomous beings detached from social bonds
and surrounding communities; to the disconnection of the present
generation from past and future ones; and to the division of life
forms into distinct categories with widely varied moral value. As a
title, The Tragedy of Fragmentation more directly engages issues of
ontology. It challenges views of being that emphasize the organic
parts and discount the wholes that they help form together with the
emergent properties that arise only at such higher levels. 65
In the end, however, perhaps the most apt new title for Hardin’s
tale would be one that points as distinctly as possible at the reasons
why the grazers might fail to get together to cooperate. Cooperation
alone is certainly not enough to avoid bad outcomes; the grazers
could cooperate to exploit the commons with zest, take their profits
and run. Cooperation thus needs to work hand in hand with sound
63. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1245.
64. I use the term and elaborate the idea in FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 157–78.
65. The point served as a central theme of Leopold’s Almanac, beginning with two muchquoted sentences from the book’s foreword: “We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity
belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with
love and respect.” LEOPOLD, supra note 56, at viii.
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values, with extensive ecological knowledge, and with a form of
humility that reflects human ignorance about changing nature. But
the cooperation nonetheless remains the key. The grazers simply
must get together, plain and simple. If external forces keep the
people apart, then we need to point to those forces and make clear
their costly consequences. But if as usual (one suspects) the grazers
are kept apart because of reasons internal to their membership,
because of the flawed culture in which they operate, then the name
for the tragedy should point in their direction.
In some way, a name that gets at this root cause should hold
high the need for the grazers to think of themselves as bound
together in a community, or more exactly, as embedded within at
least two communities, the social and the ecological. Practically
speaking a good grazing arrangement will respect nature as an
interconnected, interdependent community of life. Humans will
appear embedded in that community and ultimately dependent on
its long-term health. In social terms, the grazers need to see similarly
that they belong to human social networks and depend on the
strength and good content of those networks. Fully good land use is
possible only when the grazers recognize these communities and,
having recognized them, work to sustain them. In that sense, we can
rightly view the health of grazing region as a condition or property
that emerges only at the community level, only when both the land
community and the human social community are healthy and
functioning well. 66 Good land use is thus an emergent property,
generated at the community level and only at that level. Seeing this,
we might then choose as our title The Tragedy of Weak
Communities or The Tragedy of Incomplete Communities.
These various names each have appeal. Perhaps they could be
used somehow in tandem. Yet one more name can usefully go on
this list, a title that seems most apt in the modern age, most apt in a
culture guided by the kind of libertarian, free-market ideology that
has gained such prominence in the United States of late.
The liberal trajectory of the Western World over the past three
centuries has brought substantial gains in many realms, of that there
is little doubt. 67 In economic realms it has fostered substantial

66. Wendell Berry makes the point, which is central to his writings, in Health Is Membership,
in BERRY, supra note 54, at 86.
67. I develop the ideas in this paragraph and the next in FREYFOGLE, supra note 34.
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increases in economic productivity, sizeable enough overall to exceed
in value the considerable associated costs. In social realms liberalism
has brought great gains for the downtrodden and unfairly burdened.
In political realms it has spread political power through increases in
suffrage. Driving much of this has been a commitment to rationalism
and empirically grounded science along with a wide-ranging
willingness to challenge and revise inherited understandings.
Providing the polestar has been the liberated individual, increasingly
free to develop and embrace values as she sees fit. This liberal social
thought did not have to carry over into the ways people viewed
nature. But to some extent it did. Nature, too, came to seem more
fragmented and competition based. This liberal view of nature in
turn made it easier to relax traditional limits on economic enterprise.
When we revisit Hardin’s tale in light of this long-term cultural
trajectory, we can see that the bad-acting grazers that he describes
are in fact familiar characters. They are exemplars of the fully
liberated individual, the individual freed of all social and economic
constraints and freed too of ethical and religious norms that might
inhibit the overgrazing (of the type Adam Smith presumed). Setting
to one side possible external causes, it was this full-bore liberation of
the individual that brought destruction to the landscape. In Hardin’s
fictional world all senses of community had disappeared. All felt
constraints were relaxed. The liberated individual grazers could
proceed as they saw fit, pursuing short-term profits and degrading
their natural home.
Thus we might consider, as a final title, “The Tragedy of
Liberalism Taken Too Far.”
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